管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。     

Inequality and entrepreneurial thresholds

We explore the relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on cross-sectional data from a largescale survey of the economic conditions of individuals across India, we develop a number of dimensions of inequality to explore empirically how inequality interacts with entrepreneurship, operationalized as self-employment or as employing other people. We find compelling evidence that there are thresholds to becoming self-employed, and even more so to assembling the combinations of resources and personal attributes required to become an employer. Greater inequality leaves more people unable to make the transition to self-employment, leaving casual laboring as the occupation of necessity. At the same time, inequality increases the number of employers in a society, by concentrating resources - particularly land and finance - enough for significant numbers of people to be able to cross this higher threshold. Lastly, greater differentiation into social or religious groups curtails the ability to cross either entrepreneurial threshold, presumably by limiting the extent and benefits of social networks of value for entrepreneurship.     

经济政策不确定性与企业员工配置——来自沪深上市公司的经验证据

企业员工配置是企业内部管理的重要一环,经济政策不确定性是否会影响企业员工配置?本文以员工数量衡量企业员工配置,利用2010-2018年沪深A股上市企业数据和经济政策不确定性指数建立面板数据模型,考察经济政策不确定性对企业员工配置的影响,实证研究发现:经济政策不确定性会显著增加企业员工配置,且该影响经更换变量、调整样本容量以及内生性处理后依旧显著,该反应在还债能力较弱、盈利能力较差、股权制衡度较高、地区经济发展水平较低的企业中更为明显。文章的研究结论对于企业管理和宏观经济管控有一定的参考价值。     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and management forecasts: The impact of enforcement changes

We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.     

协作型企业供应链管理

供应链管理作为一种新型的企业关系管理模式在现代市场竞争中为企业生存与发展提供了一种工具。本文针对协作型企业供应链管理进行了研究。协作型企业供应链由于其业务联系上的紧密性与其他供应链有所不同，在生产计划制定上强调生产计划的一致性与协调性，核心企业与供应企业在生产计划制定方面的信息共享；在销售管理上强调企业与销售商集成式管理。     

网络预算管理

本文介绍了网络预算管理是如何有效地克服传统预算方法的缺点,通过有效的控制去解决企业预算管理工作中的实际问题,指出了该预算方法能大大提高工作效率和管理效率。     

关于如何提高财务管理教学质量的几点建议

针对财务管理学的特点,本文分别从教学内容、教学方法、教学手段和考核方法这四方面探讨了如何提高财务管理的教学质量.     

"红色管理"探析

"红色管理"是对中国共产党的管理理论、管理思想和管理方法的总结.在现代社会有许多组织独具慧眼,兴起了向中国共产党学习"红色管理"的浪潮.与此同时,"红色管理"理论体系也开始构建."红色管理"在现代社会的盛行有其独特的原因,它是中国管理现状发展的必然选择.但在借鉴"红色管理"的过程中应深刻领会和把握"红色管理"内涵,应紧密联系自身实际借鉴"红色管理",还应面向未来借鉴"红色管理".     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.